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From Subsidiarity to ‘Free Choice’: Child- and 
Elder-care Policy Reforms in France, Belgium, 
Germany and the Netherlands
 
Nathalie Morel
 
Abstract
 
This article analyses the patterns of  reform in care policies in Bismarckian welfare systems since
the early 
 

 
s. Based on a comparison of  France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, the
article shows that these reforms share similar logics and trajectories, which can be explained by
the shared conservative and corporatist traits of  Bismarckian labour markets and welfare state
institutions and their impact on labour market adjustment possibilities and preferences. Indeed, we
argue that care policy reforms have been very closely linked to specific employment strategies, and
the politics of  welfare without work and subsequent attempts to shift away from such a labour-
shedding strategy go a long way in explaining both the nature and the timing of  child- and elder-
care policy reforms in Bismarckian welfare systems. The article also shows how a focus on
promoting ‘free choice’ in all four countries has justified the introduction of  measures that have
simultaneously reinforced social stratification in terms of  access to the labour market – meaning
that some women have much more ‘free choice’ than others – and weakened certain labour market
rigidities. To conclude, we argue that care policy reforms have provided a backdoor for the
introduction of  labour-cheapening measures and for increasing employment flexibility in otherwise
very rigid labour markets.
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Introduction
 
As has been argued by various authors (cf. Daly and Lewis 
 

 
), care
policies provide a fruitful point of  entry for analysing welfare state change.
Indeed, care policies represent in most cases a relatively new responsibility
for the welfare state and are in fact one of  the most dynamic areas of  welfare
state expansion (cf. Daly 
 

 
). As such, care policies are part and parcel of
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the restructuring of  the welfare state. This restructuring involves both a
recasting of  the overall set of  relationships between family, market and state,
and a transformation of  gender relations and norms.
The aim of  this article is to examine this process of  reform and restruc-
turing in the Bismarckian or ‘conservative corporatist’ welfare systems.
Basing our inquiry on a comparison of  France, Belgium, Germany and
the Netherlands, we seek to draw out the impact of  the specific nature of
Bismarckian welfare state institutions on the nature and timing of  the reform
trajectories in childcare and elder-care policies implemented over the past
 

 
 years.
The choice of  these countries may at first sight seem problematic. Indeed,
while it has become common for comparative welfare state analysts to speak
of  welfare state clusters, there has been some considerable debate as to which
criteria are most relevant for identifying these clusters. These debates have
mostly been spurred by Esping-Andersen’s 
 

 
 tripartite welfare regime
typology.
Various scholars have called into question this typology, often by pointing
to important intra-regime variations along one or more specific variables. In
this respect, the conservative regime is perhaps the one that has elicited most
criticism, not least from gender theorists who have argued that Esping-
Andersen’s predictions in terms of  the low levels of  services and of  female
labour-market participation associated with the conservative welfare regimes
hardly hold true in the case of  France or Belgium, which both display fairly
high public childcare coverage for children aged 
 

 
 and above. Similarly,
various works have highlighted important intra-regime differences with
respect to employment levels for women or lone mothers, or regarding
poverty rates among single-headed families, and with respect to other gendered
patterns of  inequalities (Lewis 
 

 
; Sainsbury 
 

 
; Bussemaker and van
Kersbergen 
 

 
). Thus, it has often been argued that France and Belgium
are not properly ‘conservative’ countries to the same extent as Germany or
the Netherlands, and various other classificatory attempts have tended to
separate these countries into different clusters.
Without discarding the theoretical and social importance of  looking more
closely at the gendered outcomes of  different welfare arrangements, my
approach here is to look at the specific policy contents and reform trajectories
rather than outcomes for defining ‘families of  nations’. I suggest that when
attention is directed towards both childcare and elder-care policies, there is
a much stronger case to be made for grouping these countries together than
if  one looks just at childcare, which has usually been the focus in gender
studies.
Indeed this article shows that patterns of  reform in care policies in
Bismarckian welfare systems share similar logics and trajectories. I argue that
it is the shared conservative and corporatist traits of  Bismarckian labour
markets and welfare state institutions – and their impact on labour market
adjustment possibilities and preferences – that have driven care policy
reforms. These reforms have been very closely linked to specific employment
strategies, and the politics of  welfare without work and subsequent attempts
to shift away from such a labour-shedding strategy go a long way in explaining
 
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both the nature and the timing of  child- and elder-care policy reforms in
Bismarckian welfare systems. Care policies have been used during the 
 

 
s
and early 
 

 
s to reinforce the traditional male-breadwinner model that
characterizes Bismarckian countries but, in the late 
 

 
s, when low employment
rates became widely regarded as the key problem for the sustainability of
these welfare states, care policies were used to raise female employment
levels. This change therefore marks a real U-turn in the role assigned to
women, who are now expected not only to care but also to work – a ‘farewell
to maternalism’ which Ann Orloff  (
 

 
) has shown to characterize other
countries also. However, the reforms implemented here bear the imprint of
the conservative corporatist legacy of  these welfare states in terms both of
reform trajectories and policy design.
In the next section I draw out the key institutional characteristics of  the
postwar model in conservative welfare states, and discuss briefly how the
strong emphasis on the male-breadwinner model, and the resulting welfare
without work syndrome, has exacerbated the welfare state crisis in these
countries – a diagnosis that became widely shared in the late 
 

 
s.
The next section describes the policy reforms implemented in these four
countries in the fields of  childcare and elder care and the policy logic that
has underpinned them. Two phases of  policy reforms can be distinguished.
The first set of  reforms, in the 
 

 
s and up to the late 
 

 
s, based on a
(female) labour-shedding strategy, has sought to reinforce the traditional male-
breadwinner model as a way to combat unemployment, while the second
set of  reforms, starting in the late 
 

 
s, has aimed at raising employment
levels, and especially female employment rates. In the four countries, however,
a focus on promoting ‘free choice’ has justified the introduction of  measures
that have simultaneously reinforced social stratification in terms of  access to
the labour market – meaning that some women have much more ‘free choice’
than others – and weakened certain labour market rigidities. Indeed, we
argue that care policy reforms have provided a backdoor for the introduction
of  labour-cheapening measures and for increasing employment flexibility in
otherwise very rigid labour markets.
The third section offers a concluding discussion of  the specific rationale
and trajectory of  care policies in Bismarckian welfare systems.
 
Characterizing Bismarckian Welfare Systems
 
A conservative corporatist postwar social contract
 
As far as care issues are concerned, three main characteristics of  Bismarckian
welfare systems should be emphasized. First, of  crucial importance is, of
course, their strong reliance on the male-breadwinner model and strong
support of  the traditional family. Various policies and tax disincentives have
traditionally discouraged women’s participation in the labour market or
encouraged their withdrawal after marriage or childbirth, so that female
participation rates have generally been low. In this model, men are expected
to work full-time and women to care full-time for children and the elderly.
This reliance on a male breadwinner in a system based on employment-
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related social insurance means that women have generally lacked individual
social entitlements and have instead received benefits through their husband.
Another defining characteristic is the principle of  subsidiarity: intervention
should not take place at a level higher than necessary; when an individual is
in need of  care, help should be sought first from the family or local commu-
nity, or from voluntary associations – the state steps in only as last resort (this
is particularly true of  Germany and the Netherlands). The belief  is that the
family is the best possible provider of  care and that substitutive policies by
the state might undermine the family. Family policies therefore offer generous
financial transfers to families to support them in their role of  primary welfare
providers but little in terms of  substitutive social services. Bismarckian countries
are thus very transfer-heavy and service-lean. The ‘freedom of  choice’ rhetoric
that later developed and which has guided care policy reforms fits well with
this principle of  subsidiarity.
Active labour market policies have typically been underdeveloped and
this is even more apparent with regard to policies to promote women’s employ-
ment. In the 
 

 
s, when faced with labour shortages, Germany, France and
Belgium chose to bring in foreign ‘guest’ workers rather than draw on the
domestic reserve of  female labour – thereby also reinforcing the male-breadwinner
model (Esping-Andersen 
 

 
; Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 
 

 
).
Scandinavian countries chose instead to bring women into the labour market,
which prompted the development of  childcare services and other policies to
help parents reconcile work and family life as early as the early 
 

 
s.
 
The crisis of  the male-breadwinner model
 
Taken together, these various characteristics help to account for the situation
of  ‘welfare without work’ which Bismarckian countries found themselves in
after the economic crisis of  the mid-
 

 
s. In a system where the family is
dependent on the male breadwinner, protecting the employment and ‘family
wage’ of  this male worker has been a central concern of  trade unions. As a
result, it has been nearly impossible for Bismarckian countries to implement
‘labour-cheapening’ strategies of  flexibilization and labour market deregula-
tion as in the liberal countries. The Nordic public employment strategy (which
prompted the rapid increase in female labour market participation) has not
been followed either. Instead, Bismarckian welfare states sought to maintain
productivity via a labour-shedding strategy, which typically took the form of
early retirement schemes and/or an expansion of  disability policy (Esping-
Andersen 
 

 
; Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 
 
). This labour-shedding
strategy also involved discouraging female labour market participation.
Such a strategy has proven problematic on many counts. Writing in the
mid-s, Esping-Andersen highlighted the self-reinforcing negative spiral
Bismarckian countries found themselves in, this strategy having resulted in
‘prohibitively heavy fixed labour costs which, in turn, discourage[d] employment
growth or, alternatively, spur[red] the growth of  informal sector jobs or self
employment’, and which were ‘particularly ill-suited to address pressures
for greater labour market flexibility and women’s demand for economic
independence’ (Esping-Andersen : ).
 ©  The Author(s)
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Indeed, women have increasingly sought to enter the labour market,
despite policies encouraging them to remain at home. Faced with a lack of
care options, either public or private (due to high labour costs), women’s
increasing participation in the labour market has often been accompanied
by a severe drop in fertility rates, and most strikingly so in the most familialistic
countries such as Germany, Italy or Spain. Women’s aspirations to work have
also come into conflict with their capacity or willingness to care for the
dependent elderly. These different trends have thus called into question the
traditional care arrangements that underpin Bismarckian welfare systems,
and this at the same time as the number of  elderly people has increased
rapidly, thus leading to a ‘care crisis’.
Ageing populations are not simply a care issue, but also a financial issue,
as fewer workers must bear the cost of  a large cohort of  pensioners. This has
been of  particular concern in Bismarckian countries, where the combination
of  labour-shedding policies and of  low female participation rates and low
birth rates have exacerbated the dependency burden.
This diagnosis became widely shared in the later part of  the s, both
at the European Commission level and in the countries under study. At the
European Commission level, much emphasis has been placed since the late
s on raising employment levels, and especially female employment levels,
in order to increase the tax base of  the social protection systems. The 
European Employment Strategy has set as key objective employment levels
of  at least  per cent for women by , and at least  per cent for men.
Policies for reconciling work and family life have been presented as crucial
measures for simultaneously reaching three aims: raising employment levels,
promoting gender equality and raising fertility rates, and member states have
been encouraged since the late s to develop appropriate policies (childcare
services, parental leave schemes, etc.). However, as we shall see, care policies
in Bismarckian countries have mainly pursued the first of  these aims (raising
employment levels).
The development of  elder-care policies has perhaps been less explicitly
linked to employment strategies, at least at the European Commission level,
but we will see how the shape and content of  these policies can nonetheless
also be linked to employment strategies specific to Bismarckian welfare systems,
based on the development of  low-skilled, low-paid personal service jobs.1
Trajectories of  Reform in Care Policies
This section describes the policy reforms that have taken place in the fields
of  childcare and elder care in each of  the four countries, starting with France
and Belgium, as these two countries have long stood out among conservative
welfare states for the amount of  public childcare services provided.
The French and Belgian specificity with regard to childcare provision is
mainly due to the existence of  the écoles maternelles, or preschools, which take
children from the age of  . Although compulsory schooling only starts at the
age of  , virtually all children aged  to  attend preschool (considered part
of  the national school system). In both countries preschools were developed
for educational purposes and to form loyal citizens/republicans, rather than
©  The Author(s) 
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as a care service to help parents reconcile work and family life. Day-care
services for children below the age of   developed rapidly in the s and
early s but expansion then stopped during the s to give way to more
private forms of  day-care arrangements. France and Belgium have developed
a similar mix of  seemingly contradictory policies that include both day-care
services to facilitate women’s employment, and cash benefits that encourage
women to stay at home. Finally, both countries share pro-natalist aims and
have developed family policies that primarily target and favour large families.
With respect to the elderly, care policies have long remained underdeveloped
in both France and Belgium. In the mid-s, there were still  per cent
of  elderly people living with their children in France – compared to  per
cent in Sweden (Esping-Andersen : ). It is only in the early s that
both countries (France especially) have developed specific policies to deal
with the long-term care needs of  the elderly.
Germany and the Netherlands have remained much closer to the tradi-
tional male-breadwinner model and, until recently, mothers of  small children
were not expected to work. The principle of  subsidiarity is very strong, and
childcare services have traditionally been provided by voluntary welfare
organizations. It is only in recent years that these two countries have started
to invest more seriously in childcare services. Both countries, however, have
a longer history of  providing care for the elderly than France and Belgium.
The Netherlands developed institutional care for the elderly long ago, while
Germany set up a fifth social insurance scheme to deal with dependency as
early as .
Despite these initial cultural and policy differences, we argue that these
countries have all followed similar patterns of  reform and that this can be
explained by the shared conservative and corporatist institutional characteristics
of  these four Bismarckian welfare systems. To strengthen our argument, policy
reforms in France are developed at greater length than for other countries
to serve as a ‘test-case’. We show that despite the prevailing perception of
France as different from other Bismarckian welfare states with respect to
family policy (Lewis ; Anttonen and Sipilä ), conservative and
corporatist traits are clearly visible both in the types of  policies implemented
and in the policy logics that have guided reforms in the past  years.
Our analysis shows that from the mid-s to the late s, in all four
countries, women have been either discouraged from entering the labour
market (in Germany and the Netherlands) or, where women had already
entered the labour market in the s, as in France and Belgium, measures
have been implemented to encourage their withdrawal from the labour
market in order to ‘free’ jobs for men. This is particularly true for low-income
women, who have been enticed to make use of  long and low-paid parental
leave schemes. For higher-income women, on the other hand, various measures
facilitating the use of  private forms of  childcare have been developed. Such
measures have typically taken the form of  tax deductions and social contri-
bution exemptions, thus contributing to a cheapening of  the cost of  labour
in the personal service sector. Such a strategy is highly compatible with the
subsidiarist principle of  Bismarckian welfare systems as it provides a solution
that is entirely based neither on the state nor on the market; instead, the state
 ©  The Author(s)
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offers subsidies to help families choose how to service their care needs.
Furthermore, such subsidies reinforce one of  the characteristic dimensions of
Bismarckian welfare systems in that they tend to reproduce and reinforce
prevailing patterns of  social stratification. Temporary leave schemes and
opportunities to reduce working hours have also been on the increase,
especially in recent years, and have contributed to a flexibilization of  labour,
especially of  female labour. Finally, despite an expansion of  policies to
promote the reconciliation of  work and family life, these measures have not
sought to modify the traditional gender division of  labour with respect to
care and domestic work, the idea being that it is up to the family to decide
‘freely’ on how to organize their private life.
France: ‘free choice’ – for those who can afford it
In the s, as a response to both feminist and labour market demands,
France invested quite substantially in the development of  day-care services.
Despite promises by the Socialist Party for the  elections to further
increase the number of  day-care places available, the s marked instead
a shift towards more private and familial forms of  childcare ( Jenson and
Sineau ; Morgan ). This shift has been accompanied by a discourse
promoting parents’ ‘free choice’ – freedom to choose whether to care for
their children themselves or not, and freedom to choose between different
types of  care options. This ‘freedom of  choice’ rhetoric, also present in the
other Bismarckian countries, is perhaps the most defining characteristic of
care policies in these welfare systems.
Two types of  policies have been pursued in France, both of  which have
been part of  a wider employment strategy: on the one hand, new benefits
have been created to promote employment by subsidizing parents who hire
childcare workers in the home. On the other hand, parental leave benefits
have been expanded to encourage certain parents to leave the labour market
to care for their own children (Fagnani ; Martin et al. ; Morgan ).
Encouraging low-paid women to withdraw from the labour market. A paid parental
leave benefit (APE) was set up in  by the Socialist government, despite
strong criticism from some members of  the party, who argued that the APE
was but a maternal wage in disguise. Indeed, the explicit aim of  this new
measure was, in a context of  falling birth rates and high unemployment, to
encourage women simultaneously to have a third child and to withdraw from
the labour market ( Jenson and Sineau ). This benefit, which was only
granted as of  the third child, gave the parent on leave the right to a non-
taxable $/month allowance for up to two years. The results were some-
what disappointing, however, as only , mothers took leave in ,
instead of  the , that had been anticipated (Fagnani ). The scheme
was therefore modified in  so that one needed simply to have worked
two out of  the previous ten years (and periods spent on maternity leave or
registered as unemployed counted as time worked) to be eligible, and the
leave was extended to three years, with the possibility to work part-time
during the third year. Pro-natalist aims were thus reinforced, at the same
©  The Author(s) 
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time as the new, more lenient work requirements aimed at getting unem-
ployed women out of  the unemployment statistics.
Developing low-skilled, low-paid work by providing subsidies to higher-income women.
The year  also witnessed the creation of  a special benefit (AGED) for
families who hire a private nanny (who does not need to be licensed or
qualified) to care for a child in the parents’ own home. This benefit covers
the employer’s social contributions and offers generous tax deductions.
Another benefit, the AFEAMA, was set up in  to cover the cost of  social
contributions when parents employ a registered childminder to care for children
in her home. The AFEAMA and the AGED were intended to develop
cheaper forms of  care than day-care institutions and to increase employment,
partly by making it easier to hire someone and partly by bringing women
working on the black market into the formal labour market.
Care policies to combat labour market rigidities. In , with unemployment levels
over  per cent and continually falling birth rates, the Conservative government
modified the parental leave scheme so as to make it available as of  the second
child, and monthly benefits were increased to around $. The pro-natalist
aims remained, but were more clearly overshadowed by employment-related
considerations, the explicit aim of  this policy being to make the labour force
more flexible by encouraging part-time work, and to free up jobs for men by
getting some women out of  the labour market, as stated by the Conservative
minister of  social affairs:
the childcare policies that are proposed, in their two components,2 will
contribute significantly to employment. We estimate that these measures
should enable the creation of  . new jobs. . or so of  these
will correspond to jobs that have been freed. Indeed, the extension of
the APE will lead certain parents to diminish or suspend their professional
activity, which corresponds to a significant change in behaviour since it
would concern about one fifth of  APE beneficiaries at the birth of  their
second child. (Simone Veil, A.N. débats no. , --, p. )
This scheme proved successful and considerably modified women’s labour
market participation: between  and , the number of  APE benefici-
aries tripled and the percentage of  mothers of  two children in the labour
force dropped from  to  per cent (Afsa ). Indeed, the long duration
of  the leave and the inadequate job protection associated with this leave have
made it difficult for many women to reintegrate into the labour market at
the end of  the leave period. The amount of  the benefit has proven too low to
entice men to take the leave and thus  per cent of  beneficiaries are women.
The  childcare reform also substantially increased the tax deduction
that could be claimed by families who hired a private nanny, and increased
the benefit for the AFEAMA.
Redomesticating childcare. The AFEAMA and the AGED have met with great
success, and spending on these programmes has increased rapidly, while
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investment in day-care structures has stagnated. Spending on childcare
policies by the CNAF (the family social security fund) increased by  per cent
between  and . The largest increase in financing has gone towards
the parental leave benefit (+ per cent), followed by the financing of  the
AFEAMA; the third largest increase has been for the AGED (+ per cent).
Meanwhile public day-care services have only benefited from a  per cent
increase. This means that of  the total budget, the proportion spent on day-
care services decreased from  to  per cent between  and , while
the proportion spent on families to help them pay for individual forms of  care
increased from  to  per cent (Leprince ).
While these various schemes are open to all working families, in practice
the use of  each of  these schemes is very much determined by the family’s,
and especially the woman’s, income level. The AGED has been used by
high-income families, the AFEAMA by middle-income families, and the
parental leave benefit has been too low to attract higher-income earners but
has proven very attractive to low-income women (Fagnani ; CNAF
). Childcare policies have thus served to reinforce prevailing patterns of
social stratification.
Finally, though there has been a diversification of  childcare over the past
 years, parental care remains the most common form of  childcare for
children under  ( per cent), followed by care in the homes of  registered
childminders ( per cent). Nurseries only account for  per cent of  all
childcare (DREES ).
A new orientation? New reforms have recently been introduced that seem to
indicate a progressive change in childcare policies. Since , fathers are
entitled to  days’ paid leave (previously ) following the birth of  a child as
part of  a move to promote a greater investment of  fathers in caring for their
children. Also, a new benefit was introduced in , the Prestation d’Accueil
du Jeune Enfant (PAJE), which brings together and replaces various schemes
and child benefits. The aim of  this new benefit is ‘to better respond to
families’ needs and expectations by promoting their freedom of  choice:
freedom to work or to withdraw from the labour market to care for their
children, and freedom to decide on the appropriate form of  care’ (CNAF
). It comprises a birth allowance and a means-tested benefit paid out
until the child turns . Parents also receive a ‘free choice supplement’, which
takes the form either of  a paid leave from work until the child turns  or of
a benefit to help cover the cost of  a private nanny or registered childminder.
This ‘supplement’ varies according to parents’ income. Though strongly
reminiscent of  the previous schemes (APE, AFEAMA, AGED), the novelty
here is that this new scheme includes special measures to encourage mothers
on leave to work part-time and to re-renter the labour force – this is in line
with the new (European) agenda of  raising female employment rates.
Elder care: encouraging informal care. While France developed childcare policies
quite early on, long-term care for the elderly only became a serious issue for
policy-makers in the early s. During the discussions on possible solutions
to the long-term care issue, policy-makers on both the left and the right were
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widely agreed on a certain number of  points. First, they were all concerned
with limiting the cost of  a new benefit and were generally agreed that raising
social contributions to create a specific insurance scheme was not an option.
They were also all generally agreed that it was important to provide incentives
to families to keep on caring, both because such a policy would prove less
expensive than providing formal care, but also because it has generally
been considered that too much state intervention is harmful to society as it
undermines the moral fibre of  family solidarity (Morel ).
A means-tested social assistance benefit for people over , the Specific
Dependency Benefit (PSD) was set up in . The PSD faced severe
criticism for a number of  reasons, however, and reform soon appeared necessary.
A new Personalized Autonomy Allowance (APA) was implemented in 
to remedy some of  the main problems identified with the PSD. Although it
remains a social assistance scheme managed at the regional level, it guarantees
the same benefit levels everywhere in France. Dependency criteria have been
extended, which has considerably increased the number of  people eligible for
this benefit. The benefit is no longer means-tested but the amount is reduced
progressively for beneficiaries whose resources are above a certain ceiling
($/month in ). Finally, the state can no longer reclaim some of  the
cost on the person’s legacy. As with the PSD, the benefit can be used to remunerate
an unemployed relative – other than the spouse – who provides care.
This new measure has proven very successful and the number of  recipients
increased rapidly, leading to higher than expected costs. This prompted the
right-wing government to introduce new reforms in  to reduce the cost
of  the benefit, most dramatically by lowering to $ the income ceiling
below which one is entitled to full benefits.
By providing a cash benefit to the dependent elderly, the idea has been to
provide dependent persons with the means to decide on the type of  care they
want – i.e. to promote free choice – but also to develop low-skilled, low-paid, personal
service jobs by transforming the dependent elderly into private employers.
Care as a source of  (low-skilled, low-paid) employment. This has proven quite a suc-
cessful employment strategy: between  and , the number of  people
employed in personal service jobs (home help, cleaning, childcare) almost
doubled, from , up to . million. However, these consist mainly of
short, part-time jobs, and the great majority of  workers have little or no
qualifications (CES ); wages are consequently quite low.
Thus, whether for young children or for the elderly, care policy reforms in
France have increasingly sought to boost employment – albeit low-skilled
and low-paid employment – by providing cash benefits to families to become
private employers. Such a strategy has been further reinforced by the
introduction in  of  a universal service cheque to enable people to hire
the help they need, and thus to create employment.
Belgium: breaking away from egalitarianism
Just like France, Belgium has gone from policies promoting public day-care
services to give all children an equal start in life to policies supporting more
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private and family forms of  care. Also as in France, this shift in policy has
been presented as a way to promote ‘free choice’ for families.
Time to care. In an effort to synthesize both the Socialist demands for more
gender equality through the development of  childcare services, and the more
traditional familialism of  the Social Christians who were calling for more
support to mothers (especially in poorer families) who chose to remain at
home, the Social Christian–Socialist coalition promised, in , to develop
public services for the family to promote mothers’ labour force participation
while simultaneously proposing a childrearing allowance (the ASP – Allocation
socio-pédagogique) to be paid to mothers who cared for their own children – an
allowance which would have effectively discouraged the labour force participation
of  mothers. The justification for voting these two seemingly contradictory
measures was, in the words of  a Social Christian senator, to ‘respect fully
parents’ liberty of  conscience. They must be able to decide whether they will
use a day nursery or they will raise their children themselves’ (quoted in
Marques-Pereira and Paye : ).
Although the parliament had passed this reform, the ASP was quickly
amended due to budgetary constraints linked to the economic crisis, and was
never implemented. The idea was not dropped altogether, however, and was
eventually implemented in  as part of  a wider leave scheme, the Volun-
tary Career Break. This scheme is more than just a parental leave scheme,
as workers can request a career break for any reason. It allows workers to
take a paid, partial or full-time leave from their job with no risk of  being laid
off, for a period of  six months to a year, renewable for a total of  up to five
years. The worker on leave must be replaced by another worker receiving
full unemployment benefits. The leave benefit is paid at the lowest unemployment
insurance rate, that is, the one available to an unemployed worker who is
cohabiting (Marques-Pereira and Paye ).
Although the break can be taken for any reason, the government and
the majority of  parliamentarians assumed that the major use would be for
childrearing, family reasons, or other personal reasons. The Voluntary
Career Break has thus been widely seen as a form of  parental leave. Yet this
scheme’s primary objective was not to help families reconcile work and
family life. More fundamentally, it was an attempt to fight the situation of
economic crisis and high unemployment that prevailed in Belgium in the
early s by redistributing work via part-time employment and flexible
working time (ibid.).
This measure generated a fair amount of  consensus, not least as it was
presented under the gender-neutral rhetoric of  ‘free choice’ – the choice to
temporarily withdraw from the labour market to care for one’s children. A
few observers did note that it would probably be mostly women who would
ask for the leave, which would constitute an additional labour market disadvantage
for them since employers might prefer to hire men in order to avoid such
interruptions, but such concerns with gender equality were strongly over-
shadowed by unemployment concerns. That it would be mostly women who
would/could take such a leave was in fact reinforced by the type and low
level of  benefit paid to the person on leave: being based on the insurance
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rate paid to an unemployed worker who is cohabiting, it assumes that the
person on leave has a (male) breadwinner to rely on.
Developing personal service jobs. The creation of  what could effectively be con-
sidered as a parental leave benefit was accompanied in the mid-s by
other measures in the field of  childcare that also served to ‘redomesticate’
childcare. In order to promote more ‘free choice’, the agency in charge of
financing childcare services decided to subsidize home-care services provided
by ‘day-care mothers’, i.e. care provided by childminders in their own
homes, alongside the day nurseries. Tax deductions were introduced in ,
leading to a tenfold increase in the number of  day-care childminders in the
French Community between  and  (Marques-Pereira and Paye
). Since then, the bulk of  state subsidies for childcare has gone to this
type of  childcare and by , there were twice as many places available with
day-care mothers as in nurseries in Flanders (Kremer ).
Here one can see evident parallels with what was done in France during
the same period both to combat ‘black’ labour and to raise employment
levels. Such an approach, although couched in the rhetoric of  ‘free choice’,
was again guided by labour-market concerns and, just as in France, marked
a notable shift away from the principle of  giving all children an equal start
in life through the provision of  good-quality public childcare. The quality of
these private forms of  childcare has in fact been a source of  debate in
Belgium, as unlike workers employed in day nurseries, day-care mothers
require no formal training (Marques-Pereira and Paye ).
Furthermore, these day-care mothers receive very low wages and pay very
little tax or insurance contributions, and they have to rely on a male
breadwinner for social rights such as pensions or sickness benefits (Kremer
). Day-care mothers therefore constitute a much cheaper and more
flexible care workforce for the state than formal day-care institution workers.
Just as in France, this subsidized ‘freedom of  choice’ has allowed higher-
income women to combine work and family as they have been able to
benefit from tax deductions when hiring a day-care mother, whereas
low-income women have had to rely on the Career Break scheme to care for
their children themselves. This redomestication of  care has thus taken
different forms for different women.
Policy developments since the late s have been couched in a more
gender-egalitarian language, although the design of  these measures does
nothing to modify gender roles. Thus, since , each parent is entitled to
three months of  paid leave as an individual entitlement, but the benefit is
flat-rate and paid at a very low level, thus effectively discouraging male
take-up. The increase in  from three to ten days of  paternity leave is in
line with policy developments across Europe.
In , a more flexible time credit scheme replaced the previous system
of  career breaks. It includes the right to a specific leave (e.g. parental leave
or leave to care for an ill family member). The underlying idea of  this new
time credit is that men and women must be given the opportunity to
reconcile a professional career with family responsibilities, thanks to flexible
entry and exit options.
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The career break or time credit scheme has thus been designed in such a
way that the same measure can be used to care for children or/and to care
for dependent elderly relatives. The Flemish Community also developed a
more specific (but modest) flat-rate care insurance for the dependent elderly
in  (Rottiers ).
Germany: towards a modified male-breadwinner model?
Germany has long promoted a strong male-breadwinner model, and strong
family obligations. Until recently, mothers of  small children were not
expected to work and childcare facilities for children below  have tradi-
tionally been scarce (Lewis ; Ostner ). Some childcare facilities have
developed for pedagogical reasons for children over  (kindergartens), but
these only take children for half  days, which means that mothers have tended
to work part-time. More recently, new policies have developed to encourage
women’s labour market participation and to tackle Germany’s low fertility
problem.
The s and early s: keeping mothers and children at home. In , the govern-
ment introduced a childrearing allowance (Erziehungsgeld ) and a parental
leave (Erziehungsurlaub) as part of  a ‘family package’, which compensated for
some of  the cuts in family benefits and tax allowances that had been made
between  and . The parental leave enables parents to take a
three-year leave from work to care for their children until the age of  , but
the childrearing allowance is only paid out during the first two years. It is a
flat-rate benefit worth approximately $ a month for a duration of  two
years. After the first six months, the benefit is reduced according to income.
The parent on leave can continue to work for up to  hours a week, with
no reduction in benefit. These schemes were introduced against a backdrop
of  rapidly increasing unemployment, and one of  the central motives for
introducing these schemes was to encourage women to return to their caring
function and to withdraw from the labour market (Schiersmann ). That
it was specifically women who were thus encouraged to withdraw from the
labour market is evident from the very low level of  the benefit.
In the early s, less than  per cent of  all children below the age of  
and about  per cent of  children between the ages of   and  had access to
publicly financed childcare (Seeleib-Kaiser ). These figures remained
stable for over two decades, and it was only in the early s that childcare
provision started to increase.
A timid expansion of  childcare facilities in the s. In , the Children and
Youth Act established a right to childcare for children aged  to , which was
to come into effect in . However, no federal government funds were made
available for implementation, and no specification was made of  the types of
places (full-time or part-time) that were to be made available. Due to financial
difficulties at the local level, implementation was delayed until . Between
 and , some , kindergarten places were nonetheless created
(Evers et al. ).
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Childcare coverage also improved a little for children under , and by
 there were . per cent of  children under  attending publicly financed
day care (Krippen) (Rostgaard and Fridberg ). This rise in figures, how-
ever, is not only due to greater investment in the West, but mostly to the
reunification, since coverage levels were much higher in the East (even if  they
began to decline after the reunification).
A driving factor behind the new interest in childcare provision was the
sharp drop in fertility rates. In , fertility rates had plummeted to a very
low . and this was increasingly perceived as a result of  the lack of  child-
care facilities, since women were forced to choose between working and
having children. Another key factor was the development of  a discourse on
gender equality at the EU level, which had an impact on the political debates
in Germany. By , supporting families, both financially and through the
development of  childcare provision, had become a major issue in the Social
Democratic Party’s election campaign.
New gender norms, new role for the state? Nowadays, mothers of  children over 
are expected to work, at least part-time. Full-time labour force participation
has not yet become the norm, however, and the day-care places that were
created during the s are mostly for part-time care. By , only one in
four children aged  to  had access to a full-time place (Evers et al. ).
The development of  childcare facilities slowed down after , but in
recent years the government has shown renewed interest in the development
of  childcare facilities for children under , including for full-time care (ibid.).
For the first time, and due to the limited financial capacity of  the Länder, the
federal government has promised financial support for the development of
childcare facilities, thus marking a break from the long-standing principle of
subsidiarity.
A revised Federal Childcare Payment and Parental Leave Act came into
force in , allowing both parents to take parental leave at the same time,
extending the permitted level of  part-time work during parental leave from
 to  hours a week, and giving parents the opportunity to take the third
year of  parental leave at any time until the eighth birthday of  a child.
Most spectacularly, Germany introduced in January  a parental leave
benefit system in line with the Scandinavian model. The existing means-
tested parental leave benefit has been replaced by a wage-dependent benefit
for a period of  one year, paid at  per cent of  previous net income (up to
$,). In order to encourage fathers to take a more active part in caring
for their children, families can obtain an extra two months if  both parents
take some leave.
Developing low-paid, low-skilled carers for the elderly. With respect to elder care,
Germany voted a compulsory, universal long-term care insurance (Soziale
Pflegeversicherung) in  (Götting et al. ; Morel ). Despite much
discussion regarding the form and financing of  the measure that was to be
implemented, all political parties and actors involved had agreed on a few
important points from the beginning. The first point was that home care
should take precedence over care in nursing homes. Second, the scheme was
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not to cover the cost of  room and board in nursing homes, nor, in fact, the
whole cost of  care. Third, time spent in formal care work deserved credit
within the pension scheme. The idea was to make caring more attractive so
that caregivers, especially women of  working age, would continue to care
rather than enter the labour market. Indeed, the reform was by no means
intended to reduce the quantity of  care provided informally.
Benefits are neither means-tested nor income-related; the amount depends
on the level of  dependency and on whether the person receives institutional
or domiciliary care. In the case of  domiciliary care (. per cent of  long-
term care insurance beneficiaries), recipients can choose between cash
benefits, in-kind benefits or a combination of  both. The cash benefit is paid
to the dependent person, who can use it to remunerate a family member or
other informal carer. When the insurance scheme was introduced,  per
cent of  persons receiving domiciliary support chose cash benefits only but
this proportion had decreased to . per cent in  (BMGS ),
meaning that there is a progressive move towards services and a combination
of  cash and in-kind benefits, although surveys still report a greater preference
for family-provided care (Lundsgaard ).
Domiciliary care services have rapidly expanded since the creation of  this
insurance scheme, but these services have remained low-skilled and low-paid.
According to Ostner (), the absence of  highly defined professional
standards in the field of  social care can be read as part of  an important
strategy against unemployment, as politicians of  all persuasions perceive
these cheap service jobs to be an important source of  employment.
Netherlands: the ‘combination scenario’ as a part-time male-breadwinner model
It is in the Netherlands that the male-breadwinner ideal has been strongest
and most long-lasting. Indeed, until the late s, women’s participation in
the labour market was particularly low (below  per cent). Since the s,
however, women have worked in ever-greater numbers, and female
participation rates are now much higher in the Netherlands than in our
other three countries. This massive entry of  women on the labour market
has been made possible mostly thanks to policies that favour part-time and
flexible employment. Indeed,  per cent of  women only work part-time
(Eurostat ).
Developing childcare facilities through the workplace. As in Germany, the principle of
subsidiarity has been very strong, and childcare services have remained very
underdeveloped. In , only  per cent of  children used subsidized
childcare (Kremer ). The idea that the family should be the prime
provider of  care for children has remained well entrenched in the
Netherlands, and even today it is considered best for children to attend
part-time care only (Knijn ).
Childcare policies only began to develop in the s, following a report
by the Scientific Council for Government Policy from . The report
underlined the large waste of  human capital due to women’s inactivity and
argued that this contributed to the Dutch welfare state crisis. In order to
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ensure a sustainable welfare state, the government argued that it was
necessary to invest in female labour market participation, and thus in
childcare (Kremer ).
The state therefore introduced a Stimulative Measure on Childcare in
, which aimed to get employers to buy ‘company places’ for their
employees in childcare facilities. These places are co-financed by the state,
employers and employees, but the contribution by the state decreased from
 to  per cent of  the total cost between  and . Parents’ contribution
also decreased over this period, from  to  per cent, while employers’
share has substantially increased, from  to  per cent of  the cost (Knijn
). Despite this, parental fees remain high and most children attending
day care therefore come from higher-income groups (Rostgaard and Fridberg
; Knijn ). This inequality is reinforced by the fact that employers
can decide which category of  their employees they buy day-care places for.
Childcare provision is thus quite socially segmented, once again testifying to
the stratifying dimension of  this welfare regime.
Parallel to this development, the number of  private childminders has also
increased rapidly. While children making use of  some form of  childcare
increased from  to  per cent between  and , the proportion cared
for by a private childminder increased from  to  per cent during the same
period (Knijn ).
The part-time miracle. Yet expansion in day-care provision has not been the
only change in care arrangements to facilitate the reconciliation of  work and
family life. More important in this respect have been the various policies to
promote part-time work. The promotion of  part-time work was seen as a
way to share work and therefore to combat unemployment. It was also
portrayed as a way to allow parents to combine work and care, the idea
being to move towards a model where both parents worked and cared
part-time – the so-called ‘combination scenario’.
Since , all employees are entitled to ask their employer to switch to
part-time work. This has been used by mothers of  young children mostly as
a means to reconcile work and family life, in the face of  still insufficient
day-care facilities. Today, the Netherlands has both the highest female
labour-market participation rate in continental Europe (. per cent), but
also the highest level of  female part-time work ( per cent) (Eurostat ).
However, unlike other countries, part-time work in the Netherlands enjoys
strong protections.
Other measures have also been created to increase work flexibility and to
respond to the needs of  the family. The Work and Care Act of   includes
measures offering workers the possibility to put aside part of  their salary in
order to finance temporary breaks for family reasons.
In , political discussion focused on the government’s plans to
introduce a ‘lifespan leave’ arrangement, giving workers greater scope to save
for periods of  time off  during their careers. Care, education and training,
leisure time and early retirement are all included and mutually exchangeable
in this proposal. The various types of  care leave already in existence, com-
bined in the Work and Care Act, will coexist with this new arrangement.
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Financially, the proposal is directed at reducing government expenditure by
giving employees more responsibility and choice in whether to save for time
off  for care or for early retirement, or even not to save at all. The scope of
this scheme may be somewhat limited, however, as only employees with a
longer working history and with higher salaries can afford to save enough to
take time off  for any substantial leave period. For this reason, this measure
is unlikely to be of  any use as a source of  parental leave because of  the time
necessary with the same employer to save up enough days (Morgan ).
Still a conservative welfare regime. Greater investment in childcare policies has
not translated into any substantial transformation of  the male-breadwinner
model – and has not really sought to, either. Rather than invest more mas-
sively in day-care infrastructure, the choice was made to reduce working time
for parents so that they can both work and care, i.e. care is still considered
as something that should be carried out within the family. This policy was
implemented without any real consideration of  the likely gendered outcome
of  such a measure (Knijn ), the discourse focusing instead, as in the
other three countries, on parents’ free choice to decide how to arrange their
work and family life.
Towards more informal care for the elderly? Surprisingly enough, although childcare
provision has been quite underdeveloped, elder-care services on the other
hand have long been much more extensive. In the Netherlands, elder care
has mainly taken the form of  institutional care, but this has begun to change
over recent years with the attempt, as in most countries, to shift towards
domiciliary care.
A new policy to support the purchase of  private care was introduced, first
on an experimental basis in , and on a national level in . This new
policy takes the form of  a ‘personal budget’, which entitles dependent people
to a care allowance to be used for the purchase of  care services, whether
informal (from relatives) or professional. The introduction of  this benefit is
part of  a move towards providing care recipients with greater freedom in
deciding how best to service their needs. It is also, as in France and Germany, a
way to offer some form of  remuneration to informal carers – and thus to
bring them into the labour market. The above-mentioned Work and Care
Act of   is another measure that has aimed at supporting informal care
towards the elderly by giving it more recognition.
Conclusion: From Labour-shedding to Labour-cheapening
As we have seen, care policies in these four countries have been strongly
shaped by, if  not instrumentalized in, the ups and downs of  Bismarckian
labour market policies. From the mid-s to the late s, when un-
employment was high, women were either discouraged from entering the
labour market (in Germany and the Netherlands) or, where women had
already entered the labour market in the s, as in France and Belgium,
measures have been implemented to encourage their withdrawal from the
labour market in order to ‘free’ jobs for men. A paradigmatic change can be
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said to have taken place in the mid- to late s, however, and these
countries have since then sought to raise female employment rates. This has
prompted an expansion of  care policies, and signalled a new role for the
state, which is taking on new responsibilities. The principle of  subsidiarity
has thus become weaker, and has been replaced instead by the idea of
promoting ‘free choice’.
While the aim of  raising female employment rates marks a departure
from the traditional male-breadwinner model, the care policies that have
been developed have nonetheless retained a conservative flavour. Care
policies have not attempted to modify the traditional gendered division of
labour in the household, and the family (or at least a family-like) environ-
ment is still considered as the best locus of  care. Care policies have also
tended to reproduce and reinforce the social stratification dimension of
Bismarckian welfare systems: while low-income women have been encouraged
to make use of  long, low-paid parental leave schemes, and thus to withdraw
from the labour market, various measures facilitating the use of  private forms
of  childcare have been developed for higher-income women. Such
measures have typically taken the form of  tax deductions and social
contribution exemptions, thus contributing to a cheapening of  the cost of
labour in the personal service sector. A similar strategy has prevailed in the
field of  elder care, where the dependent elderly are encouraged to buy
private personal services.
Thus it appears that, rather than develop good-quality jobs in the public
sector, as in the social democratic welfare states, Bismarckian countries are
responding to the service sector needs of  post-industrial economies by
promoting low-skilled, low-paid jobs. Women’s entry into the labour market
has also enabled a certain flexibilization of  the labour force, most notably
through the introduction of  temporary leave schemes and opportunities to
reduce working hours, both of  which have proven successful with women
looking for ways to reconcile their professional life with their family duties.
One can therefore argue that care policies have provided Bismarckian
countries with a means to circumvent certain labour market rigidities specific
to these systems.
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Notes
. Due to space constraints, elder-care policies are treated more succinctly in
this article. The article by Da Roit, Le Bihan and Österle in this issue provides
a more detailed account of  these policies and their link with employment
strategies.
. She is here referring to the proposed modifications of  both the parental leave
scheme and of  the AGED and AFEAMA, which we will discuss below.
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